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ARGUMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
The underlying facts of this case are fairly straight-
forward: Defendant Gay, after eliminating one-time partner Tony 
Versteeg, and helping arrange the pledge of James E. Hogle, Jr.'s 
stock to the F.D.I.C., assumed full control of Liberty West 
Development. Defendant Gay then allowed a small judgment 
creditor, with whom he had made arrangements to repurchase the 
Ogden-IRS property for himself, to execute against the property 
over a $6,000.00 judgment (though his agreement with the creditor 
was to purchase it back for only $4,000.00). He did this with no 
notification to the F.D.I.C., which he knew had Hogle's rights in 
Liberty West Development. He continued to accept lease payments 
in the name of LWD, operated the lease under the LWD identity, 
sued a neighboring property owner for contamination in LWD's 
name, and failed to record any sheriff's deed until over one-and-
a-half years after the execution sale redemption period expired. 
R. 1168-69. Contrary to defendants' continuing assertions, LWD 
was never in such dire financial condition that it could not pay 
the debt to the creditor. The evidence demonstrates that the IRS 
property was the "cash cow" of LWD and afforded the company a 
substantial positive monthly cash flow and had a net equity for 
LWD of between $600,000.00 and $1,000,000.00. Further, the funds 
Gay used to purchase the property came from an account of another 
of Gay's numerous companies which at the time owed LWD far more 
money than the cost of purchase from the judgment creditor. See, 
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Statement of Facts, pp. 4-9, Appellant's Brief. 
The facts of this case are even more egregious than those of 
two of the major Utah cases concerning breach of fiduciary duty 
and misappropriation of corporate opportunity/asset, Glen Allen 
Mining Co. v. Park Galena Mining Co., 11 Utah 362, 296 P. 231 
(1931) and Nicholson v. Evans, 642 P.2d 727 (Utah 1982). Rulings 
of the trial courts in this case have been reversed once, and to 
do justice in this matter the trial court's decision must be 
reversed again. 
POINT I 
DEFENDANTS' STATEMENT OP THE CASE IS PULL OP MISSTATEMENTS, 
MISREPRESENTATION OF THE LAW, AND IMPROPER ARGUMENT 
Defendants7 statement of the case is mostly a long rant 
about Aurora's alleged misconduct, which is "supported" by 
numerous factual misstatements and misrepresentations of the law 
and law of the case herein. It starts out by once again repeating 
its completely discredited assertion that the IRS property was 
"lost" because LWD was in such financial straights that it 
couldn't pay a small judgment creditor to "save" the property 
which provided a substantial regular income to LWD and had equity 
of well over a half million dollars. See, above and Statement of 
Facts of Aurora's principal brief. There is no evidence to 
support this but the self-serving, conclusory statements of 
Defendant Gay. 
Defendants go on to claim Aurora and its counsel have 
engaged in "contumacious" conduct by asserting that Aurora 
refused to honor the trial court's orders, citing, oddly, the 
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motions to amend the initial rulings in the mid-90's, which 
motions were subsequently vindicated by the Utah Supreme Court's 
decision in Aurora Credit Services v. LWD, et al., 970 P.2d 1273 
(Utah 1998) ("Aurora I"). 
Aurora cannot go through every erroneous statement of 
defendants; however, some have been used repeatedly and 
apparently pursuasively to the trial court, and therefore need to 
be addressed in detail at this point. Two arise out of questions 
involving Aurora's notes of conversations between Aurora's 
president, Charles F. Zak, and defendant Gay: (1) as to the 
alleged "promise" to provide them to defendants, and (2) their 
purported critical relevance to the issue of fraudulent 
concealment. 
First, as to the "promise" to provide them to defendants: 
there was no promise. Defendants assert this promise arose during 
the first deposition of Mr. Zak in January, 2001. (Aurora had 
previously served its Responses to Defendants' First Set of 
Discovery on May 17, 1999, and defendants raised no objection to 
the adequacy of Aurora's response in the over year-and-a-half 
period.) Aurora has included the relevant pages of the deposition 
in the addendum hereto (Addendum A), since defendants' recitation 
did not include the full relevant transcript. Defendants' then-
counsel asked for the notes in the middle of the deposition, and 
Mr. Zak responded: 
A: There's—you know, I don't know how you take notes, but 
there's notes and then I said talked — and then I got 
"talked to Eric," like in the next paragraph on these notes. 
Then I have some internal notes. So I don't, you know — 
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Whereupon, then-defense counsel interjects: 
Q: I don't want to see anything until counsel has a chance 
to review it. 
Then Aurora's counsel stated: 
Mr. Hartman: I think we'd be happy to go through these and 
black out anything that would be under attorney-client 
privilege and so forth, and provide you with the rest. 
(Emphasis added.) Both counsel and Mr. Zak discuss whether it 
would be preferable to reserve those matters for another time, or 
go ahead and depose Mr. Zak regarding those notes cind 
conversations without handing over the complete notes. It was 
agreed that Mr. Swallow would proceed and question Mr. Zak on the 
notes. The transcript then goes on for seven pages of Mr. Zak 
going through his notes and Mr. Swallow occasionally interjecting 
with questions. See, Addendum A, transcript pp. 51-59. 
That was the last Aurora and its counsel heard from 
defendants' then-counsel Swallow regarding any need for the 
notes. No follow-up request was made, and Aurora believed the 
matter had been reviewed to Mr. Swallow's satisfaction. If there 
was any doubt, it was certainly removed by Swallow's filing his 
Certificate of Readiness for Trial shortly thereafter. 
Thus, the full reading of the several pages of transcript 
shows there is absolutely no basis for defendants' repeated claim 
that Aurora had in any way "promised" to provide defendants' 
then-counsel the actual notes. 
Second, as to the "critical relevance" of those notes on the 
issue of fraudulent concealment, this has likely b€>en a 
completely disingenuous attempt by defendants' current counsel to 
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create an issue where none existed. This is because it is 
perfectly clear that those notes are completely irrelevant to 
that issue under the holding of Aurora I, where the Utah Supreme 
Court clearly stated that defendants, having "not shown that 
despite affirmative concealment of its having disposed of the 
asset, a reasonable person would nonetheless have discovered the 
wrongdoing, in this case, before purchasing the Hoale judgment." 
Aurora I at p. 1279 (emphasis added) . All of the conversations 
represented in the notes occurred after Aurora purchased the 
Hogle judgment. In spite of being well aware of this, defendants 
have repeatedly ranted about how these notes are the most 
critical evidence in this case, and in support of this clearly 
erroneous stance have repeatedly cited the trial court, and now 
the Court of Appeals, to language from Aurora I which is merely a 
part of the Supreme Court's preliminary recitation of the facts 
taken as true for purposes of the summary judgment it was 
reviewing. These initial factual statements are obviously not a 
part of the holding of the Court in Aurora I. Yet, at the 
constant urging of defendants, the trial court apparently 
accepted this unsupportable argument. 
Another problem which has plagued Aurora is the 
defendants' continuing attempts to reargue what is the law of the 
case regarding standing of a pledgee to bring derivative claims 
under Rule 23.1, Utah R. Civ. Pro., and the trial court's 
apparent inability to recognize this fact. See, e.g., Defendants' 
motion for summary judgment filed on or about October 19, 2001, 
cited by defendants in their brief on p. 9 as addressing Aurora's 
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alleged inability to establish the fraudulent concealment 
exception. In reality, the only point attempted by defendants in 
this motion was to try to talk the trial court into rewriting the 
law of the case. R. 1140-51 (defense memo) and hearing 
transcript, R.3346 (pp. 30-46 in Addendum B) . This issue of 
pledgee standing under Rule 23.1 was fully briefed by the parties 
prior to the first grant of summary judgment, R. 273-79; 290-93, 
was orally ruled on by Judge Thorne in the F.D.I.C.'s favor at 
the hearing, R. 593, p. 57, L. 15-19, was briefed by Aurora for 
first appeal herein, and opposition to which defendants dropped 
and waived by not controverting it in their brief. That on top of 
the fact that, if the Supreme Court had not adopted the pledgee 
standing rule, its entire opinion would have been unnecessary. 
This continuing attempt by defendants to reargue what has long 
been resolved under the law of this case is disingenuous at best. 
One final matter needs to be addressed. Defendants have, 
ever since the appearance of their current counsel, kept claiming 
that they just couldn't figure out what Aurora's claims are or 
what the factual basis is. This is simply another red herring 
foisted on the current trial court. This case had been pending 
for eight years before defendants' current counsel appeared. 
The matter has been before two prior judges and the Utah Supreme 
Court, and defendants had previously had two teams of attorneys 
working on their behalf. Yet none of defendants' prior counsel, 
nor the two prior judges, nor the Supreme Court had ever raised 
any question of the sufficiency of Aurora's claims herein. And 
the record certainly demonstrates that at least defendants' prior 
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counsel would have if they thought it had merit. It is nothing 
more than another attempt by defendants/ current counsel to 
create an issue, since it had become apparent that defendants had 
nothing to rebut their clear fraudulent concealment. 
POINT II 
THERE IS NO "ACTUAL NOTICE" OR "ACTUAL RECEIPT" 
STANDARD ON SERVICE OF PROCESS OR PLEADINGS ISSUES 
Defendants' main argument in their efforts to support the 
trial court's actions herein is their assertion that courts 
"routinely" apply some undefined "actual notice" or "actual 
receipt" standard when determining the sufficiency of service of 
process or pleadings under the applicable rules of civil 
procedure. There simply is no such "notice or receipt rule" and 
none of defendants' citations support such a position. 
Defendants begin their argument by citing a few tax 
commission cases. However, as defendants mention in passing, 
those tax cases are not decided under the rules of civil 
procedure, but specific statutory provisions in the tax code, and 
therefore are completely inapposite to the propriety of service 
of defendants' second set of discovery herein. In these tax 
cases, the critical point is actual notice, since several 
provisions in the statutory scheme of the code's imposition of 
tax deficiencies are triggered by the notice. In order to obviate 
the possibility that the taxpayer simply ignores the deficiency 
notice, the tax code provides a "safe harbor" that, if the notice 
was mailed to the "last known address" of the taxpayer, it is 
"sufficient" whether the taxpayer receives the notice or not. 
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However, since actual notice is the goal, the courts have held 
that so long as receipt is shown and no prejudice is shown, it 
does not matter how the notice got to the taxpayer. See, 
Clodfelter V. C.I.R.. 527 F.2d 754, 756-57 (9th Cir., 1975). 
This is, however, not the analysis of courts interpreting 
issues of proper service under the federal rules of civil 
procedure or similar state procedural rules such as Utah's. Quite 
the contrary, courts uniformly require strict construction of the 
procedure rules pertaining to substituted service by mail. See, 
e.g., Salley v. Bd. of Gov., Univ. No. Car., 136 F.R.D. 417, 419 
(M.D.N.C. 1991)(courts require strict and exacting compliance 
with Rule 5(b) for service by mail); Timmons v. United States, 
194 F.2d 357, 360 (4th Cir. 1952)(same); Harper Macleod 
Solicitors v. Keaty & Keaty, 260 F.3d 389, 398 (5th Cir. 
2001)(Texas law requires strict compliance on substituted 
service); Macrnuson v. Video Yesteryear, 85 F.3d 1424, 1429-31 
(9th Cir. 1996)(neither FAX nor Federal Express qualify as 
service by mail); Baade v. Price, 175 F.R.D. 403, 405 (D.D.C. 
1997)(strict compliance required for service of process); Chai v. 
Kong, 93 P.3d 936, 939 (Wash.App.Div. 1 2004)(strict compliance 
when service by mail); Dietrich v. Elliott, 528 N.W.2d 17, 21 
(Wis.App. 1995)(same); McGraw-Hill, Inc. v. Futrell, 823 S.W.2d 
414, 416 (Tex.App. 1992)(same); Rocky Mtn. Adj. Co. v. Pease 
Bros., 604 P.2d 921, 923 (Utah 1979)(strict compliance required 
under Wyoming rules) . 
This requirement of strict compliance when serving pleadings 
or process by mail is obviously well justified by the effect of 
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complying strictly with the procedural provisions - if done 
properly, the service is valid even if it was never received. 
Timmons, supra, at 194 F.2d 361. 
Nor is there any support for defendants' assertion that 
there is any such "actual notice or receipt" test governing 
validity of service of pleadings or process, much less that such 
standard is "routinely" applied in discovery situations, as 
asserted by defendants. Neither of the two cases cited by 
defendants to purportedly show this "routine" use of an actual 
notice standard supports defendants' position. In JouJou Designs 
v. JOJO Liane Internationale, 821 F.Supp. 1347 (N.D.Cal. 1992), 
the plaintiff had served numerous deposition notices addressed to 
"Mr. JoJo Ligne" instead of to Joseph Linus, the defendant's 
president. Defendant admitted receipt of the notices but ignored 
them because of the incorrect name. Defendant then brought a 
motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute, and plaintiff brought 
a motion to compel deposition. The court found the defendant's 
dismissal motion frivilous because it was substantially similar 
to a motion previously denied by the court, and the court granted 
plaintiff's motion and compelled Linus to submit to the taking of 
his deposition. The fact that defendant had actually received the 
prior deposition notices, along with a properly titled and 
noticed document request which he also ignored, belied his 
argument that plaintiff had failed to undertake discovery. 
Plaintiff's motion was granted and Linus was ordered to submit to 
a deposition. Thus, the actual receipt of the incorrectly titled 
notices of deposition were not, as defendants suggest, held to be 
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valid and the basis of any sanction, but were used to demonstrate 
that defendant knew plaintiff was trying to take his deposition 
and supported its finding that his dismissal motion was frivolous 
and sanctionable. In a similar manner, Toner Seae (U.S.A.), Inc. 
v. Edmar Corporation, 81 B.R. 593 (9th Cir. BAP 1988) , does not 
support defendants' actual notice standard. Defendcint Edmar had 
filed one motion to dismiss for failure to comply with discovery 
(presumably under R. 37(d)) after numerous delays without 
response. After hearing the motion, the court entered its Order 
on December 5, 1986, which awarded fees for the delays, and, 
finding dismissal not yet warranted, ordered that the remaining 
discovery requests were to be complied with by January 5, 1987, 
and explicitly warned that failure to comply would mean 
dismissal. The court clerk's notice of the order purportedly 
failed to reach Tong Seae's then counsel because he had never 
filed a written notice of substitution of counsel cis he had been 
advised and court rules required. He did, however, receive a copy 
of the order by December 31, 1986, but had still not complied by 
the time of the second hearing on January 30, 1987. The court 
found that the failure of the clerk to get the order to Tong Seae 
was because its attorney had failed to properly appear on its 
behalf, and noted that it still had almost the same thirty days 
to respond prior to the second hearing. The court dismissed the 
adversary proceeding. Id. at 81 B.R. 595-96. Thus, the case does 
not reflect a court upholding the validity of a defective service 
of discovery by a party simply because it was eventually 
received. 
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Furthermore, the reporters are littered with cases which 
expressly reject defendants' argument that actual notice is 
adequate where service is defective. Among them, and apparently 
not noticed by defendants, is Booth v. Crockett, 173 P.2d 647 
(Utah 1946), wherein the Utah Supreme Court expressly rejected 
this argument when addressing the service of process therein. As 
the Court stated, "The fact that Frank actually did receive the 
summons has no bearing whatever on the question of whether or not 
the Fairbanks home was his "usual place of abode". Id. at 173 
P.2d 650. Among the cases cited above as to strict construction 
for substituted service, several also, quite naturally, reject 
the relevance of actual notice or receipt. See, e.g., Salley, 
supra, at 136 F.R.D. 420 ("[A]ctual notice by a means other than 
that authorized by Rule 5(b) does not constitute valid service 
and is not an exception to the rule." FAX is not proper 
service.); Harper Macleod, supra, at 260 F.3d 398-99 
(typographical error in suite number of forwarding address 
renders service defective; actual notice is of no consequence); 
Magnuson, supraf at 85 F.3d 1431 (Federal Express is not mail 
under R. 5(b) and actual notice does not suffice); Baade, supra, 
at 175 F.R.D. 405 (without strict compliance with service rules, 
actual notice is irrelevant); McGraw-Hillf supra, at 823 S.W.2d 
(actual receipt of suit papers could not cure defective service). 
See alsof Norsyn, Inc. v. Desai, 351 F.3d 825, 826-29 (8th Cir. 
2003)(summons actually received by private courier service does 
not constitute valid service by mail under rules); Leisure v. 
Ohio, 12 Fed.Appx. 320, 321 (6th Cir. 2001)(actual knowledge of 
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lawsuit will not cure defective service of process); Marshall v. 
Warwick, 155 F.3d 1027, 1033 (8th Cir. 1998)(receipt of documents 
is not the same as service) ; Arthur v. Litton Loan Serv. , 249 
F.Supp.2d 924, 927 (E.D. Tenn. 2002)(actual knowledge is no 
substitute for proper service of process); Grabner v. Willy's 
Motors, Inc.. 282 F.2d 644, 647 (9th Cir. 1960)("The fact that 
the papers were forwarded to appellee in due course is 
irrelevant. An invalid service may be quashed notwithstanding the 
fact that no prejudice can be shown.11) (emphasis added) ; Tart v. 
Hudgins, 58 F.R.D. 116, 117 (M.D.N.C. 1972) (provisions of rule 
may not be ignored merely because defendant received actual 
notice). 
Defendants7 attempts to distinguish cases cited by Aurora 
are merely grasping at illusory straws. All the cases cited by 
Aurora support its position. Defendants' erroneous exposition of 
the J.D. Pharmaceutical case, 893 F.2d 1201 (11th Cir. 1990), on 
page 26-27 of their brief is the third time that defendants' have 
grossly misstated the decision therein. See, e.g. , pp. 3-4 of 
defendants' Reply in Support of Motion to Compel at R. 1650-51 
and pp. 4-6 of Aurora's Objection to Proposed Order at R. 1716-
18. 
Finally, defendants' suggestion that Aurora is somehow 
estopped from raising the defective service of the discovery 
because defendants had previously and thereafter used the same 
wrong address is the height of chutzpah. Of course, no legal 
authority is cited for this bizarre theory. Defendants' counsel 
was notified by Aurora's counsel in November, 2002 of their use 
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of an incorrect address in their initial mailings to Aurora's 
counsel. Mr. Magleby indicated he would correct the problem. It 
was not corrected. Defendants' counsel was again notified as to 
the problem on January 10, 2002, regarding the attempted 
discovery service, and yet he still used the incorrect address in 
mailing defendants' compel motion. See R. 1568-73, for the only 
admissible evidence of this ongoing problem. Similarly, 
defendants attempt to assert a lack of responsibility for using 
an incorrect address at the middle of p. 10 of their brief, by 
claiming that they "served" the second set of discovery on 
Aurora's counsel at the incorrect address. Defendants then assert 
that "As Defendants later discovered, this address contained a 
single-digit typographical error - the correct address is 
apparently 2.558 South Wilshire Circle, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84109." This completely disingenuous argument implies that 
Aurora's counsel's address was difficult for defense counsel to 
ascertain and overlooks the fact that they had previously been 
advised of this improper street number, R. 1568-73, and that the 
correct street had been on every pleading and communication from 
Aurora since prior to current defense counsel's appearance 
herein. Now, defendants wish the Court of Appeals to put a stamp 
of approval on defense counsel's knowing, willful, and malicious 
abuse of our procedural rules. The Court should be loath to do 
so. 
POINT III 
DEFENDANTS' ASSERTIONS AS TO THE CLARITY OP THE TRIAL 
COURT'S APRIL 8, 2003 ORDER AND AURORA'S "UNQUESTIONABLE" 
VIOLATION THEREOF ARE PATENTLY FALSE 
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Defendants' bold claim, that the trial court's April 8, 
2003, Order was so crystal clear as to Aurora's obligations 
thereunder that Aurora's filing a response, including its 
objections, is "indefensible", would be laughable if not for the 
severe consequences suffered by Aurora. Aurora believes it 
complied with the plain and ordinary meaning of the* Order, 
drafted by defendants, as pointed out in its initial brief, pp. 
22-25. However, any ambiguity must be construed against the 
defendants, as drafters of the order, under well established 
rules of construction. 
Initially, defendants have attempted to dismiss the import 
of the portion of the Order which declared that the court would 
appoint a special master to resolve outstanding discovery 
disputes if requested by either party. Footnote 13 of defendants' 
brief is itself indefensible for its complete misstatements. 
First, defendants characterize the court's promise to appoint a 
special master to resolve all discovery disputes as simply an 
"earlier statement", when defense counsel certainly knows that it 
was a critical part of the court's ruling from the bench as well 
as a significant part of the Order itself, an Order which was 
drafted by the defendants. Then, defendants erroneously assert 
that instead of appointing the special master, the trial court 
instead decided "to address the motion to compel itself... ." 
Obviously, the court's consideration of the compel motion was at 
the same hearing at which the issue of whether defendants should 
be allowed to conduct further discovery in light of their 3+ year 
claims that they were done with discovery. The court's bench 
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ruling that it would "allow" defendants to conduct more discovery 
was at the same time as its promise to appoint the special 
master. Next, footnote 13 goes on to state that, as to the 
argument that the trial court's failure to abide by its promise 
to appoint the special master, "Aurora cites no legal authority 
to support this position, because there is none." Apparently 
defense counsel did not read Aurora's brief, which addresses this 
issue on pp. 35-36, and cites two cases in support of Aurora's 
position that a trial court's discretion to modify prior rulings 
does not extend to situations where a party is harmed thereby. 
The "bait and switch" action of the trial court in this case 
certainly prejudiced Aurora. Instead of having a special master 
to spend the time, which the trial court apparently didn't have, 
to review the discovery abuses engaged in by defendants, Aurora 
is going through another appeal to correct this gross miscarriage 
of justice. 
Defendants also try to minimize the court's failure to abide 
by its own Order after Aurora properly requested the special 
master appointment. At least twice in their brief (p.13, first 
full paragraph and middle of page 38) they attempt to 
characterize the request for appointment of the special master as 
a "motion." This is clearly an attempt to infer that Aurora was 
raising some new matter before the trial court with its request, 
something that the court was under no obligation to grant, when 
defendants know full well that the request was only to trigger 
the appointment of the special master which the trial court 
expressly promised in its April 8, 2003 Order. 
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Somewhat surprisingly, the only transcript support provided 
to attempt to shore up defendants7 assertion that the April 8, 
2003 Order was "crystal clear" and that Aurora certainly knew 
what its obligations were thereunder is a portion of the 
transcript from a hearing over a year after the hearing out of 
which the April Order arose. Clearly, what the tricil court said 
in a hearing over a year later could not inform Aurora of 
anything about what the expectation of the court was when it was 
"responding" to the discovery a year earlier according to what 
the plain and simple language of the Order instructed. 
But perhaps its not so surprising, considering that there is 
nothing in the transcript of the March 26, 2003 hearing to 
support defendants' position. See R. 3347. The court certainly 
made no rulings as to the propriety of defendants' discovery 
requests, and obviously, since Aurora had yet to respond to the 
discovery, no rulings on any objections. The only discussion of 
the objects of defendants' discovery requests are general, non-
specific comments found at R. 3347, p. 9, L. 17 - p. 10, L. 14. 
Then, the transcript at R. 3347, p. 15, L. 25 - p.16, L. 14 makes 
clear to Aurora that the court had not reviewed the defendants' 
discovery requests in any significant way. 
Further, there is no comment by the trial court in the 
transcript suggesting that he was going to grant defendants' 
motion to compel. In addressing Aurora's counsel initially as to 
defendants' discovery, at R. 3347, p. 28, L. 3, the court stated 
simply "Why shouldn't I - why shouldn't I allow th€>m to do some 
additional discovery?" Defendants, in fact, can only point to one 
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comment by the trial court which they claim supports the 
purported "grant11 of their compel motion, but which does not: 
when Aurora's counsel began to discuss the purported "service" of 
the discovery by defendants (and after the court had advised the 
parties of his limited time to complete the hearing, p. 27, L. 
21) , the court interjects, "Well, I understand that. I don't need 
to hear that." R.3347, p. 32, L. 1. Defendants suggest that this 
simple statement shows that "the court considered and rejected 
the argument that the Second Set of Requests had been improperly 
served". Defendants' brief, bottom of p. 11. As usual, defendants 
have grossly oversold this comment. Aurora believes that, by its 
express language and the context of trying to conclude the 
hearing, the court simply meant what it said - that the court 
understood Aurora's legal argument and wished to spend the little 
remaining time on other issues. This is supported by the fact 
that within a couple minutes the court was making its oral ruling 
that it was "going to allow additional discovery" by the 
defendants. R. 3347, p. 33, L. 4. Defendants themselves belie 
their claim that the Order was crystal clear in footnote 6 at 
page 13 of their brief, where they state, 
"So there would be no confusion on the issue of service, 
Defendants re-served their Second Set of Requests on April 
2, 2003, shortly after the trial court's oral ruling on the 
motion to compel at the March 26, 2003 hearing." 
Aurora would suggest that, in actuality, defendants re-served the 
discovery because Aurora had just filed its Objection to Proposed 
Order on March 31, 2003, pointing out the failure of defendants' 
proposed order to reflect the court's ruling, and defendants knew 
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Aurora's objection had merit. 
It is improper to utilize the harsher sanctions of Rule 
37(b) in the absence of a specific and unambiguous Rule 37(a) 
order. Doing so on the basis of a simple order to "respond" which 
does not even mention the subject matter inquired into, as 
herein, is "inconsistent with both the structure and language of 
Rule 37 and unsupported by any respectable authority." R.W. 
Intern. Corp. v. Welch Foods, Inc., 937 F.2d 11, 16 (ist Cir. 
1991). Because the court's hearing on March 26, 2003 and its 
April 8, 2003 Order had no real discussions of the subject matter 
inquired into, let alone any ruling thereon, Rule 37(b) could not 
come into play. Id. 
Thus, as shown above, there is nothing to support 
defendants' contention that Aurora's response, including its 
well-grounded objections, was "indefensible," but all evidence 
points to the inescapable conclusion that Aurora's response was 
in complete conformity with the ordinary meaning of the language 
of the April 8, 2003 Order, and completely consistent with the 
trial court's oral ruling from the bench, as well as the content 
of the arguments at the March 26, 2003, hearing. Quite simply, 
Aurora did not violate the Order. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT'S IMPOSITION OF THE SEVEREST SANCTIONS 
AGAINST AURORA IS ITSELF INDEFENSIBLE, AND IS CLEARLY 
ERRONEOUS UNDER ANY STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Aurora believes that it has shown in its principal brief and 
its reply to defendants' arguments above that the trial court was 
clearly erroneous to the extent it actually "granted" defendants' 
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motion to compel in its April 8, 2003 Order, and therefor its 
subsequent sanction order based upon that grant must be reversed 
since defendants would only have been in a position to bring a 
proper compel motion following Aurora's filing of its Response to 
Defendants' Second Set of Discovery. Similarly, as shown above in 
the immediately preceding point herein, Aurora did not under any 
reasonable interpretation violate the April 8, 2003 Order, and 
there is no evidentiary basis to support such a conclusion. 
Defendants' brief, Point III, essentially cites some cases 
and merely alleges, without any meaningful comparison, that the 
facts and circumstances in this case are similar or more 
egregious. This is patently false. In fact, the conduct of the 
dismissed parties in all the cases cited by defendants are quite 
comparable to the conduct of defendants herein, not that of 
Aurora. Aurora has twice had bring motions to compel defendants 
to answer Aurora's Second Set of Discovery to Defendants, and 
after being expressly ordered by the court in the summer of 2002, 
to answer everything not explicitly provided before, defendants 
have still not provided any meaningful answers. See, Aurora's 
Objection to Adequacy of Defendants' Supplemental Responses, R. 
1386-1430, and Addendum thereto at R. 1699-1709. It is these 
objections to defendants' refusal to provide any information as 
to accounting, defendant Gay's numerous business entities, and 
other matters which have prevented Aurora from determining its 
full damages, and finding out who may have information as to the 
capitalization of these companies to support the claim for a 
constructive trust. These serious shortcomings of defendants' 
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answers are what the special master appointment was meant to 
resolve. However, the court inexplicably failed to abide by its 
own Order. 
Aurora believes looking at a factor cited by many federal 
courts when determining whether an abuse of discretion has 
occurred in imposing discovery sanctions is particularly apt in 
this case: whether the court warned the sanctioned party in 
advance that dismissal would be likely as a sanction for 
noncompliance. Archibeque v. Atchison, Topeka & Sante Fe Ry. Co., 
70 F.3d 1172, 1174 (10th Cir. 1995); Mobley v- McCormick, 40 F.3d 
337, 340 (10th Cir. 1994). This goes to the reasonable 
expectation of the sanctioned party under the facts and 
circumstances presented. In this case, if there was one thing 
that was perfectly clear to both parties, it is that if either 
side had disputes with the discovery responses of the other, upon 
the request of either side the court would appoint a special 
master to resolve those disputes. It was explained by the court 
and understood by defense counsel. R. 3347, p. 33, L.4 - p. 35, 
L. 9. Aurora filed its response to defendants' discovery, filed 
the request for appointment of the special master, and the 
defendants and the trial court then failed to follow through 
under the provisions of the April 8, 2003 Order. Certainly this 
course of action of both the defendants and the court was well 
outside the reasonable expectations of Aurora and constitute an 
abuse of discretion. 
Although defendants assert that the trial court adequately 
explained its decision in its minute entry, it did so without any 
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ruling on the propriety of either the discovery requests or the 
objections. As seen above, the court's totally unsupported 
conclusion that Aurora had acted "in direct contravention of the 
Court's Order" by failing to provide defendants with what 
essentially amounts to all of Aurora's investigative notes is 
just simply inexplicable in light of the court's Order which 
specifically provided that such disputes of either party would be 
resolved by a special master. 
Aurora believes the trial court's actions herein fall four-
square within the analysis of both Chudasama v. Mazda Motors 
Corp., 123 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 1997) and Continental Insurance 
v. Chase Manhattan Mortgage, 59 Fed.Appx. 830 (7th Cir. 2003). As 
in the Continental Insurance case, this trial court's failure to 
consider the well-founded objections would require Aurora to 
respond to extensive discovery requests involving irrelevant 
evidence. Id. at 59 Fed.Appx. 839. See also, Aurora's principal 
brief, pp.3 6-37. As the court in Chudasama noted, 
When a party moves the court to compel discovery, the court 
should consider and rule on the objections filed by the 
resisting party. 
Chudasama, supra, at 123 F.3d 1370. 
Similar to the circumstances in Chudasama, several of 
defendants' discovery requests are nothing more than asking 
Aurora to research the defendants' case. See, Id. at 1358. There 
are no grounds to allow defendants to obtain all of Aurora's and 
its counsel's notes of conversations with witnesses and the like. 
All those persons are still alive and nothing prevented 
defendants from going and talking or deposing those persons 
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themselves. 
It has seemed to Aurora, and apparently to defense counsel 
as well, that the trial court has been more concerned with 
disposing of this case than "doing justice" for some time. At the 
hearing on May 2, 2002, the first question to Aurora's counsel 
was "I guess the first question I have to ask, Mr. Hartman, if I 
grant the motion for summary judgment, is there any need for — 
to address your motion at all?" R. 3346, p. 3, L. 17-19. Although 
the court correctly denied the summary judgment and granted 
Aurora's compel motion, he failed to address the point raised by 
Aurora that defendants were clearly attempting to rewrite the law 
of the case regarding pledgee standing under Rule 2 3.1, both 
therein and afterward. Then, at the March 26, 2003 hearing, in 
spite of the ample evidence of gross failures on defendants' part 
to adequately respond to Aurora's discovery, the trial court 
ordered in part that all discovery was to be completed within 
sixty days. Obviously, this sort of ruling played right into the 
hands of the defendants' long history of resisting Aurora's 
legitimate discovery needs. The saving grace of the April 8, 2003 
Order was its promise that, upon request, which Aurora fulfilled, 
the court would appoint a special master to resolve all discovery 
disputes. Obviously, in light of defense counsel's representation 
at the hearing that they had produced everything, and Aurora's 
ample objections to the adequacy of that production, the master 
was clearly needed. Then, at the May 5, 2004 hearing, the court 
apparently accepted as fact defense counsel's unsupported 
assertions that Aurora had wilfully and clearly violated the 
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crystal clear requirement of the April 8, 2003 Order, R.3348, pp. 
8 - 2 0 , and then dismissed the court's concern that it finally 
must decide the pledgee standing issue (which has already been 
decided under the law of the case) with his groundless theory 
that it was Aurora's burden to prove that if the F.D.I.C. had 
received notice, it would have done something to "save" the 
property. R. 3348, p. 23 - 25, L. 2. Throughout the hearing, 
defense counsel urged the court to impose various sanctions or 
grant his other motions in various ways, basically telling the 
court which approach he liked because of the likelihood of it 
disposing of the case and his confidence of such orders being 
defensible on appeal. See, e.g., R. 3348, p. 14, L. 2 - 16; R. 
3348, p.25, L. 3 - 10. Defense counsel even attempted to 
alleviate the court's concern about his argument being in direct 
conflict of the F.D.I.C.'s security agreement, by making the 
knowingly false assertion that the security agreement document 
was not an F.D.I.C. document! First he asserted that it was just 
a form document which defendants had and forwarded to the 
F.D.I.C, and then claimed that it was a document which came from 
Aurora, in spite of the obvious fact that Aurora was not even 
involved in the case at the time of its execution! See, R. 3348, 
p.54, L. 12 - p. 55, L. 15. Yet, it is apparent that the trial 
court accepted defendants' groundless arguments and decided it 
could simply ignore its promise to have a special master resolve 
the discovery disputes, and just throw Aurora out of court on 
the, as seen above, unsupportable determination that Aurora had 
wilfully violated the purportedly "explicit" order to provide 
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defendants everything they wanted. There is simply no basis for 
the trial court's memorandum decision, and its decision to throw 
out Aurora's claims under the facts and circumstances herein 
constitutes a clear abuse of discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
Aurora has overwhelmimgly demonstrated that the rulings of 
the trial court herein leading to, and including, its decision to 
toss Aurora's claims out are clearly erroneous. First because its 
purported "grant" of defendants' compel motion is erroneous as a 
matter of law; second, because its conclusion that Aurora 
violated the court's April 8, 2003 Order is clearly erroneous and 
lacking any evidentiary support; and, third, because its 
imposition of the ultimate sanction against Aurora in complete 
contravention of the provisions of its own Order constitutes a 
clear abuse of its discretion. 
Aurora respectfully requests the Court of Appeals reverse 
the trial court on all grounds, and remand the case to a 
different trial judge to appoint a special master to resolve 
discovery disputes, or make such other and further remand orders 
as it finds appropriate. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 29th day of August, 2005. 
«$£>/? ^s*-*.~«« 
Eric P. Hartman 
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ADDENDUM A 
Partial transcript of Deposition of Charles F. Zak 
January 23, 2001 
; , et al -v- LIBERTY WEST DEVELOPMENT INC, et al 
1 
1 2 1 3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
i 8 \-y 
! 10 
i H 
; 12 
i 13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
1 25 
Q. 
A. 
Q-
A. 
Q. 
A. 
day to 
Q. 
A. 
within 30 days of th 
correspondence. 
"Mr. Gay expressed 
you would have diff 
the entire $87,500.0 
day time frame, ~ho\* 
Credit-Services, Inc. 
a substantial down p 
part with terms if ne 
•plan you may propo 
be approved by the < 
Committee at Auror 
Inc. 
"I hope you can tata 
the substantiaWisco 
Creclit Services, Inc 
offer you. If you ha 
questions, please do 
contact me. 
"Sincerely, Charles 
Who was that lette 
James Hogle. The 
What address was 
220 Kearns Buildii 
Okay. 
Then there was a let 
Dennis Gay. 
Okay. 
And this was just D< 
Development, Inc. Do you w 
everytl 
Q-
A. 
ling? Or isn't that nece 
Go ahead. Give it t( 
949 East 1240 Soutf 
Regarding James E. Hogle. 
"Dear Mr. Gay, 
"Enclosed please fine 
original stock certific 
in the possession of/ 
Services, Inc., a copy 
assignment of this stc 
from James E. Hogle 
Federal Deposit Insui 
Corporation and a co] 
assignment of this stc 
to Aurora Credit Sen 
"If you have any que< 
free to contact me." 
And then there was a 
on there. 
Q. So two letters dated 
"^^""^^^Tl^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^j^^M^^^^E 
Page 51 
here was our telephone 
right. Now, other than what 
>o far, including what we've set 
agraphs in the response to 
•er 33 that we just went over, and the 
ve indicated. I'd like to know — 
d numerous telephone conversations 
993 in this response, 
ember any specific 
n other words, do you remember 
ngs, like the day you picked up 
d and talked to Mr. Gay and asked 
Or is this all you can remember? 
^egot notes of our 
ke to go over those notes of 
. In fact, I don't believe those 
d in our discovery requests, and 
ness notes are discoverable, unless 
ions between you and your counsel. 
you know, I don't know how you 
;'s notes and then I said talked -
id to Eric," like in the next 
Page 52 | 
lotes. Then 1 have some internal 
>u know ~ 
it to see anything until counsel 
sw it. 
MAN: I think we'd be happy to go 
lack out anything that would be 
t privilege and so forth, and 
^ rest. 
TOW: That would be great. I'd 
I those notes. I wonder if for 
osition it makes any sense to go 
»se conversations, or if you'd just 
br a later time. 
ESS: I think it would. 
MAN: You think it would be 
h them now? I guess what we need 
s can you go through there and pull 
te to you some of your specific 
th Mr. Gay or Mr. Hogle were without 
ESS: Right. I think 1 could. 
MAN: Okay. 
ESS: We'll just briefly go 
t — does that sound fair? 
TOW: Sounds fair. If I have any 
i^^^^^^^^WTi^M^i^il^mA^^^a 
13 (Pages 49 to 52) 
0 7 H Q / i Q 0 Q « f K Q A~7W^ n n n * ^ 1 7 C Q K D y 1 r m 
: , et al -v- LIBERTY WEST DEVELOPMENT INC, et al 
1 other questions we can follow i 
2 you handle it another way. 
3 THE WITNESS: Okay 
4 February 18th, 1992. 
5 Q. BY MR. SWALLOW: 
6 A. Talked to Hogle: Ne*e< 
1 Liberty West. Wemeed to start 
8 to get something settled —just j 
9 need to get something settled oi 
10 He-tells me that the bui 
11 building — IRS building is back 
12 they're trying to get it sold. 
13 Dennis and attorneys. I 
14 attorney were trying to make de 
15 Amcor. Dennis or James Ht>gle 
16 financing to brfdge~this — bridg 
17 the building was sold. He said 
18 '92 financial statements of Libe 
19 verify the stock assignment we 
20 February 12th. 
21 Q. Just a second, you're g 
22 me. 
23 A. Okay. 
24 Q. And you said somethii 
25 stock certificates? 
1 A. Verifying with Dennis t 
2 the stock assignment that I sent t< 
3 Q. Okay 
4 A. 2-12, talked to Dennis C 
5 Amcor started initial clean up. 
6 Q. 2-12. What year would 
7 1992? 
8 A. '92, right Pending sale. 
9 well, Dennis told me now, pendii 
10 Banker was the real estate agent, 
11 sale was ~ they were trying to rei 
12 because of the Amcor environme 
13 the attorney's name. I think it wa 
14 something like that. They were t 
15 something with Amcor. 
16 These notes were a little 
17 day before the other one Dennis c 
18 that their neighbor, Amcor, spille 
19 diesel and gas were spilled. The) 
20 it up They were going to try to c 
21 microbiol some kind of micrc 
22 He said the IRS asked th( 
23 about whether the IRS were wilh 
24 because of that He said they wei 
25 proposal from Amcor He said h 
Page 55 
•ur equity. 
i me they were going to 
>ceed with the sale. At that time 
building had - building's worth 
0,000. There was a loan of 
0,000. So there was about a million 
getting someone -- Dennis was 
> someone into purchase our 
nd Liberty — he said Liberty West 
n to make payments for Hogle. 
of mine. 
I talked to Hogle. He said 
) make an appointment to find 
Aurora's share. 5-1,1 had another 
logle. This was just 
just basically about the Amcor 
>m of that page when I finished 
ded Liberty West — Liberty's 
and a letter acknowledging stock to 
id a letter about the Amcor spill, 
lowledging stock to Aurora9 
? 
nt the stock certificate to i 
Page 56 
eceived? 
ist — 5-18 is another 
regarding the environmental damage 
MAN Excuse me Who is that 
ESS That was with Hogle 
WALLOW Do you recall 
hese conversations9 They kind of 
, you know, when I read the note, 
) has their own little system If you 
u're going to say, what the heck's 
ou jot down notes and it jogs your 
you were talking about 
lestion about a notation about 
stock certificates What was 
ou trying to accomplish with sending 
to Liberty West9 
to accomplish that they knew 
rDICs position now 
14 (Pages 53 to 56) 
o-7no/tooo ~n-»n y(7k^ nnn* i/t-t7CQC0>i^'3O 
;, et al -v- LIBERTY WEST DEVELOPMENT INC, et al 
Page 59 
1 A. June 1st Dennis said h 
2 that he met with the attorneys al 
3 something out on the spill detai 
4 Q. Is this 1992? 
5 A. Yeah. June 3rd Denni 
6 they do not have a finaa&ia4~5ta1 
7 all their check — all-tlieir receip 
8 in all their receipts and someon* 
9*~"taxes. He said he'd send a verif 
10" stock certificate at that point, h 
[ 1 Were sending a ten day demand 
12 talking more about the Armco c 
13 Q. It's actually Amcor. 
14 A. Amcor, okay. You kn 
15 some ~ few other notes we m\i 
16 Q. Well, let's just keep gc 
17 I'm going to ask you at the end 
18 else, so I want to get through to 
19 A. Okay. Here's 6-15, lei 
£0 left message and talked to Jim. 
l\ will call Dennis, find out where 
12 was. Called secretary, left a me 
13 conversations with Eric. 
14 And then there was the 
£5 when, you know, we had all the 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
all seemed real positive with botl 
Then there was a conversation or 
claimed that Liberty no longer o^ 
Q. So we're talking about '< 
MR. HARTMAN: '93. 
A. That one, yeah. 
Q. BY MR. SWALLOW: : 
go through all your notes. Do yo 
or records of phone conversation 
other than the files that you have 
A. No. 
Q. This is your complete -
file? 
A. Right. 
Q. Okay. Would there be i 
conversations that you had with 1 
A. Well -
Q. -- that wouldn't have be 
A. Other than these, yeah. 
Q. That wouldn't - that yo 
for? 
A. There's always a possib 
might have called or I might havi 
forgot to, you know, jot down th< 
it was important I would have wr 
L possibility that not every call 
w, written down. 
id. But there wouldn't be 
iere that would have a copy of notes 
versations? 
f the conversations occurred 
set today or you can't find a 
files, you wouldn't be able to 
weeks from now? 
IOW, unless someone told me 
lly. Oh yeah, I do remember. You 
w having gone through this half 
» you recall ever specifically 
for any information regarding 
5s? 
.11 specifically shareholder 
t minutes of shareholder meetings? 
be able to recall that either, 
'er ask Dennis about information 
-s and who they might be in the 
Page 60 
r asked him about who the other 
:an, I remember a few conversations, 
it was with Hogle or Gay, and the 
brought out. And I know that there 
y, that it was a grey area whether 
/ed or not. I know that much from 
en Hogle and Gay. 
er recall prior to the 1993 
n Mr. Hartman we talked about ever 
all the company records? 
all the company records. I 
cial statements, income statements, 
what I'm trying to do, I'm 
le relationship between shareholder 
trying to collect on a judgment. A 
»remember that my conversations 
ay and James Hogle, they weren't 
'hese two — I mean, if someone 
omething or there was a problem, 
ng it out. These guys never 
' were having a problem, 
s talked positive about, yeah, 
^^miss^m^iiis^^^m^^^^^M^^^XJ^^^^'^WM^W^^Ms. Kansas*" <^Maabjm^^^L^;> 
P 
l
" » ' i l ' SJE 
15 (Pages 57 to 60) 
ADDENDUM B 
Partial transcript of hearing, May 2, 2002 
MR. HARTMAN: Well, obviously, we have a significant 
disagreement as to what the law on pledgee standing is and 
what the.law of this case is. 
First, I want to make a comment about the way in 
which the defendants have brought this motion for summary 
judgment. They bring a motion for summary judgment that has 
several pages of what they call undisputed facts. Now, I 
think defendants7 counsel are aware that Rule 4-501 requires 
summary judgments to be started out by a statement of 
undisputed material facts. 
Then they go on and have about two pages of 
argument, which essentially just says, Hogle and—and Gap were 
the shareholders, Hogle and Gay knew, pointing to the 
conclusary affidavit of Hogle and—and the affidavit of Mr. 
Gay and therefore, nothing was concealed from the 
shareholders. That was really the extent of their argument in 
their—in their primary memorandum here. 
So, the plaintiff then went through and disputed 
virtually every alleged undisputed fact that was set forth in 
the defendants' primary memorandum and including whether or 
not the F.D.I.C. was a shareholder, addressing that issue, 
which is the law of the case in this case, which I'll get to 
in a moment. 
Then the defendants came back and the bulk of their 
reply memorandum was an attempt to demonstrate why their 
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previously asserted undisputed material facts were not 
material or relevant. And then they make an argument that 
they 3idn/t make in their—in their initial memorandum that 
said, Well, it's really just Hogle who counts, because 
erroneously claiming that the plaintiff, Aurora, got their 
interest from Hogle. Quite the contrary, the plaintiff got 
their interest from the F.D.I.C., not from Hogle. They had no 
contact with Hogle whatsoever prior to acquiring the interest. 
THE COURT: So, it's your position, if I find that 
the F.D.I.C. was the owner of the shares, then I can deny 
their motion for summary judgment? 
MR. HARTMAN: I think that is the law of the case, 
in fact, your Honor. Clearly at the—at the decision, at the-
-at the oral decision rendered by the judge, he stated that 
the F.D.I.C. clearly had standing to sue under the pledgee 
stock analysis. This pledgee stock analysis was a major part 
of the briefing done by the parties in the prior summary 
judgment motion. And the court stated from the bench that, 
you know, clearly, the F.D.I.C. had standing under the pledgee 
analysis, but the court felt that in fact because Aurora 
purchased the interest from the F.D.I.C. some six days after 
the redemption period expired, the contemporaneous ownership 
rule barred Aurora from having standing to su<e. 
Now, the Supreme Court did not specifically address 
where—whether the F.D.I.C. was a shareholder for purposes of 
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the contemporaneous ownership rule, because the defendants did 
not respond when plaintiff addressed that issue and briefed 
that issue in its appeal brief. 
There are—and—and frankly, I—I don't want to go 
in but the—the—the arguments on that are generally in the 
file. They're—they're presented and fully briefed. The fact 
of the matter is, the plaintiff briefed the issue of the 
F.D.I.C. being a shareholder under the contemporaneous 
ownership rule as a pledgee. That proposition is accepted by 
virtually any court, every court that has looked at it, by the 
American Law Institute, by various other treatises. 
The Gowans case didn't have anything to do witl| the 
contemporaneous ownership rule, shareholder issue. It was 
about whether or not an officer or director could remain an 
officer or director after he pledged his stock, because the 
articles of incorporation said that the officers and directors 
have to be stockholders. That's the only thing that the 
Gowans case was about. 
Now, after the plaintiff had addressed that in its 
appeal brief, the defendants opted to not engage in that 
issue. They did not argue at all that the F.D.I.C. was not a 
shareholder under the contemporaneous ownership rule. They 
made a couple of very vague allusions to that, well, probably 
the F.D.I.C. couldn't even have—have sued under this case, 
but they didn't make any kind of an argument, they didn't make 
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any kind of briefing to the Supreme Court on that issue. 
So, the Supreme Court issued this opinion on the 
basis that the F.D.I.C. certainly would have had standing to 
sue. It's—it's interesting to note that had the Supreme 
Court seriously disputed or had question as to whether or not 
the F.D.I.C. was a shareholder for purposes of the 
contemporaneous ownership rule, their entire opinion was— 
would not have been necessary. 
They're £alking about when the—when the—when 
Aurora bought the interest from the F.D.I.C. in November of 
791, allegedly six or so days after the redemption period 
expired. That's the critical issue, that's the criticalfdate 
issue. They indicate—the F.D.I.C. acquired its interest back 
in early 1990. Well, if the F.D.I.C. was not a shareholder 
for purposes of the contemporaneous ownership rule, then why 
in the world did the Supreme Court go ahead and go through 
this long opinion setting out standards for exceptions to the 
contemporaneous ownership rule and so forth, when all they had 
to say was, hey, shareholder's a shareholder, F.D.I.C. wasn't. 
So, the—the point is, the fact that the F.D.I.C. 
was a shareholder for purposes of the contemporaneous 
ownership rule has been decided, both by the trial court and 
implicitly, by the Supreme Court, because there was no point 
of having their opinion if they felt otherwise. And the 
defendants waived that issue by not addressing it in their 
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appeal briefs. And they can't be heard to—to try to 
resurrect that issue now, when they feel it's probably their 
only qtxance to get rid of this case. 
So, getting back to the question of summary 
judgment, there are clearly factual disputes. All inferences 
must be taken in favor of the party opposing a motion for 
summary judgment. Now, the defendants can jump up and down 
all they want to suggest that Hogle's 2004 bankruptcy 
examination did not have to do or did not contradict their 
position that that—that in fact he was advised. It does, 
however, and in fact, clearly it does, because the question 
was, Gee, did you—did you discuss saving the property or 
anything else? And he said, not to me. 
And then he went on to say how, because of his other 
problems, he, you know, he didn't have time to deal with 
Liberty West and he didn't know what was going on and he 
wasn't involved and so on and so forth. And the bottom line 
is the—the inference, the only reasonable inference, I 
believe, can be drawn from his response to his bankruptcy 
examination questioner was that in fact, he didn't have any 
discussions with Dennis Gay prior to that sheriff's sale in 
May of '91, he didn't have any discussions with him about 
saving the property, about Dennis maybe buying it. 
And quite frankly, Dennis Gay's own affidavit 
states, in Paragraph 15, prior to the sheriff's sale, I 
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informed Hogle about the sheriff's sale and discussed with him 
the prospects of investing additional capital in Liberty West 
Development to, among other things, retire the obligation owed 
by Liberty West Development to Restaurant Store. Hogle 
declined the offer to invest in capital. I also disclosed to 
Hogle that at the time XMI would purchase the property. 
Now, clearly, Dennis Gay says that he discussed with 
Jim Hogle the prospect of saving the property and now, the 
defendants are here saying it doesn't conflict with anything 
that's in our motion, doesn't conflict with Dennis' affidavit, 
doesn't conflict with Hogle's affidavit. It clearly conflicts 
with Dennis Gay's affidavit and with reasonable inferences 
drawn in favor of the plaintiff, it clearly conflicts with 
Hogle's affidavit. Hogle's affidavit is completely 
conclusary. 
Now, I don't know what the defendants may have paid 
Mr. Hogle for that—for that affidavit, but it doesn't say 
anything other than, gee, prior to that sheriff's sale, I— 
Dennis told me about this. That's all it says. 
Well, I think any reasonable inference from his 
bankruptcy testimony, under oath, is that it contradicts what 
he's saying in his affidavit. And it—and it certainly 
contradicts what Mr. Gay is saying in his affidavit. Now, 
that's where, at least, the—a factual dispute is there. 
With regard to whether or not they ar entitled to 
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judgment as a matter of law, which is essentially the second 
step of—in determining whether someone is entitled to summary 
judgment, it's already the law of this case that the F.D.I.C. 
was, quoT:e, a shareholder for purposes of the contemporaneous 
ownership rule. The prior judge on this case said so in his 
ruling from the bench. 
The plaintiff briefed it on appeal. The defendants 
chose not to brief it on appeal. The Supreme Court rendered a 
judgment that has to be read as concluding that in fact, the 
F.D.I.C, as the trial judge said, clearly had a right to sue, 
so the F.D.I.C. was in fact a shareholder and any argument to 
the contrary has been waived by the defendants and is the law 
of this case. 
And the fact of the matter is that Aurora acquired 
its interest from the F.D.I.C, not from Hogle. This is like 
the defendants saying, gee, Hogle had some stock and then he 
transferred the stock to Party A and then he transferred it to 
Party B and—or the—or that Party A transferred it to Party B 
and then Party B transferred it to Party C and then someone 
comes—if Party C decides to file a claim under the 
contemporaneous ownership rule, they can go back and say, oh, 
gee, we told Hogle, who they got the stock from, who—who was 
the source of their stock, well, that—that's ridiculous. 
And it's equally ridiculous here because Aurora 
didn't acquire its interest from Jim Hogle. It acquired it 
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from the F.D.I.C. and the F.D.I.C, as this Court previously 
ruled and as the Supreme Court necessarily had to have ruled 
to—to _go about in carrying on their opinion, that the 
F.D.I.C, was a shareholder for purposes of contemporaneous 
ownership rule. And there's no reason the Court should re-
address that issue and there's no reason that if the Court did 
re-address it, that they would come to that conclusion, 
because no case cited by the defendant stands for the 
proposition that—that a pledgee, as the F.D.I.C. was, is not-
-does not have sufficient interest to file a derivative suit. 
No case cited by them and no case that I've seen states that 
proposition. 
Furthermore, the F.D.I.C. was clearly not just a 
creditor. So, all this scare talk about, oh, geez, small 
corporations will have to send notice to all the creditors of 
their shareholders, blah-blah-blah-blah. The F.D.I.C. was the 
holder of the stock certificate. It was sent to them by Mr. 
Gay, along with a corporate acknowledgement that in fact, Jim 
Hogle had transferred his stock to the F.D.I.C. 
Now, he claims that he doesn't—didn't know the 
specifics of the proxy agreement hat Hogle signed, which 
basically goes ahead and—and—and states that essentially, 
the F.D.I.C. has all the rights that arise out of that stock 
interest except perhaps to sell it. They have the right to 
notice, they had the right to vote, they had the right to 
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participate in meetings. And the point is, what interest did 
Mr. Gay feel that the F.D.I.C. didn't acquire? Even from the 
documents that he admittedly knew about. 
Those documents say that Hogle transfers, assigns 
and sells his stock to the F.D.I.C. And now, they want to 
come back and say, gee, I—you know, I didn't have any idea. 
He sent the stock certificate to the F.D.I.C. He sent the 
F.D.I.C. information regarding the financial status of Liberty 
West. He knew full well that the F.D.I.C. was the person, was 
the entity that was entitled to notice and to vote and to 
discuss what should be done with regard to the corporation's 
only significant asset. 
So, the point is, factually, there are disputes and 
besides that, even if there weren't considered to be factual 
disputes, the defendant is not entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law because it's the law of this case that the 
F.D.I.C. had standing to sue. And the only question is 
whether they advised the F.D.I.C. and they have admitted that 
they didn't. 
MR. JORDAN: I know it's been a long argument, your 
Honor, and I will—I'll try to be brief. 
Let me deal first with Mr. Hogle and the alleged 
dispute at issue of fact. It seems to me that the conclusive 
answer to that subject is this: Here we are on the same when 
summary judgments are being argued. They have not taken Mr. 
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Hogle's deposition. They've complained that his affidavit is 
conclusary. And they haven't taken his deposition. They want 
to Doint to something which your Honor can read as well as any 
of us and say, well, the words "anything like that" at the end 
of a question about saving the property for—from foreclosure 
should encompass the idea of buying it from the purchaser of 
the sale. 
Well, it—I don't need to say anymore about that, 
the words are obvious to the Court. But when you want to 
resist a summary judgment motion and you don't like somebody's 
affidavit and you think it's conclusary, then you take their 
deposition. And they chose not to. This is not the day* for 
them to come and say, oh, geez, we wish there were an 
inference here somewhere. 
I will not dignify comments about how much Mr. Hogle 
was paid for his affidavit with a response. I'm sure your 
Honor knows that smacks of a certain desperation. 
Let me deal with the law of the case issue. First 
of all, I—I have before me the portion of the transcript that 
the plaintiff has quoted, and in that context, the Judge said 
that the F.D.I.C., as pledgee of James Hogle, has standing to 
sue derivatively on behalf of Liberty West. It was not a 
basis for the Court's ruling, it was dictum, at best, because, 
although it's mentioned in the bench ruling, it is not in the 
order, the written order of the court. And I don't think the 
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judges would want to be subject to having every word in the 
bench ruling parsed by counsel. The written order that they 
issue is the order of the court and which—and is the order 
which is appealed. 
So, if you want to know why the Supreme Court didn't 
even address the subject and why the defendants didn't address 
it in their briefs, it's because it's nowhere in the written 
ruling of the Court and so therefore was not on appeal. It is 
not a basis for the Supreme Court's ruling, it's not a 
predicate for the Supreme Court's ruling; but at the end of 
the day, it's also not contradictory in any way to the 
proposition which I'm asserting here. Could the F.D.I.C.f back 
in 1991, let's say the summer of 1991, after they had taken 
their stock pledge, sue derivatively if Mr. Hogle had refused 
to do it and the corporation had refused to do it? 
Well, that's an interesting question, not one that 
was really before the District Court when it first ruled and 
that's probably why it's nowhere in the written ruling of the 
Court; but even if you accepted the idea that, as an equitable 
beneficial rights holder, somehow the F.D.I.C. could have 
asserted the right to sue, the flip side is not true. You 
cannot say because the F.D-I.C. may have been able to get a 
right to sue if other people had refused to, that somehow now, 
the corporation owed duties to the F.D.I.C. as if it were a 
shareholder. Those are not mutual statements of law. 
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And in that regard, your Honor, let me deal with 
what's been said about all the cases and the A.L.I., the 
American Law Institutes Principles of Corporate Governance has 
a position on whether or not equitable interest holders have 
certain rights. They take a position on that and in Paragraph 
7.02, their comment on their own position, they recognize that 
their position is the minority position. And they recognize 
that there's a majority position and they're not with it. And 
they recognize that—and I suppose it's clear enough that the 
Nebraska case, the Miller vs. Crouse case which the plaintiffs 
cite, is part of that minority position with which the A.L.I, 
agrees. But it's not the Utah position and we know it's^ not 
the Utah position, not just from the Crouse case—not just 
from our—our own Supreme Court case, we know it from the 
statutory law of this jurisdiction. We have a statute on this 
point. It is 16-10a-723 Sub 2, Sub B. And it sets forth the 
procedure by which, quotes, the rights or privileges—for 
establishing, quotes, the rights or privileges that the 
corporation recognizes in a beneficial owner. 
If you want to be—have the rights of a shareholder, 
even though you're not a shareholder, just a beneficial owner, 
then we have a statute by which those rights get recognized. 
And that is not applicable in any way in this case. 
So, at the end of it all, the F.D.I.C. is not a 
shareholder to whom the company owed any duties to make 
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shareholder disclosures. And failing to establish that Mr. 
Hogle lacked any disclosures, the plaintiff's case must fail 
for lack of standing. 
Thank you. 
THE COURT: Your—what's the name? Versteeg? 
MR. JORDAN: Versteeg. 
THE COURT: Versteeg. He—he likewise is a 
participant in all of this and has chronology. 
MR. JORDAN: No. I—I don't say that, your Honor. 
Mr.—there is a disputed issue of fact about whether Mr. 
Versteeg was even a shareholder. I don't think there's a 
dispute about him not getting notice. The dispute between the 
parties is whether Mr. Versteeg had relinquished his interest 
in the corporation a couple years before 1991. 
The point is, that's an immaterial fact because the 
United States Supreme Court says if you want to assert, if you 
want to try to step into somebody else's shoes for some 
fraudulent concealment purposes, then you can only step into 
the shoes of the person with whom you are in the chain of 
privity. 
Now, Counsel made—misunderstands my argument if he 
says that somehow I'm saying Aurora took from Mr. Hogle. I 
know they didn't take from Mr. Hogle. They took from the 
F.D.I.C. who took from Mr. Hogle. There's a chain there that 
goes back to Mr. Hogle. There's no chain that goes to Mr. 
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Versteeg. 
So, whatever Mr- Versteeg says or whatever his 
status as a shareholder may have been is immaterial in every 
way to this motion. Only Mr. Hogle's knowledge is at issue, 
because they're the only one—he's the only one in the chain 
that leads through the F.D.I.C to Aurora. 
THE COURT: Well, wasn't there some sort of an 
argument that Mr. Versteeg—that somehow the plaintiff could 
claim through him? 
MR. JORDAN: No. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. JORDAN: I—I'm not aware of any such— 
MR. HARTMAN: Your Honor, that was—the^-the 
argument of the defendants in—in their initial brief, and 
which is why I am—was asking that the reply brief be—or for 
me to be allowed to file a supplemental memorandum; their 
argument in their initial brief was simply that Aurora would 
have to show that—that the defendants concealed some 
transactions from the shareholders, plural. 
Then they went on to say shareholders were— 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. HARTMAN: —Gay and Hogle. 
THE COURT: Okay. I understand that. 
MR. HARTMAN: And then, in their reply, they made a 
completely different argument. 
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MR. JORDAN: There's no disputed fact on this, your 
Honor, and I—I cite the Court to Page 1273 of the Supreme 
Court's ODinion which reads, On February 20th, 1991, Hogle 
executed a security agreement in favor of the F.D.I.C. in 
which he pledged 2,500 shares of L.W.D. stock as collateral 
for the judgment. 
And then it goes on to explain how, as a package of 
assets on Nove—in November of 1991, Aurora Credit Services 
purchased the package of assets from the F.D.I.C. at a 
judgment action. That package included the judgment against 
Hogle* 
There's no claim here in any way that Aurora tpok 
some interest in stock through Mr. Versteeg. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you very much. 
MR. HARTMAN: Your Honor, if I may, I—-again, r 
would like to request an opportunity to re—file a formal 
response to the essentially new argument that the defendants 
raised in their reply memorandum. 
And I would also like to address some of the things 
that have been said here, because quite frankly, there has 
been what I view as a misrepresentation of the comments of th£ 
American Law Institute section. The conference did not say 
that the—the position allowing a pledgee standing under the 
contemporaneous ownership rule was the minority position, Xt 
says—it said that a couple of states have actually 
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incorporated the fraudulent concealment exception into their— 
into their— 
THE COURT: Well, would you disagree— 
MR. HARTMAN: —particular statutes— 
THE COURT: Would you disagree with his statement 
that it doesn't apply in Utah because we have a statute? 
MR. HARTMAN: Your Honor, I have—I—the statute is 
simply not relevant, I believe, to this particular issue* I 
haven't seen the statute cited in any of these pleadings. 
The—the point is, you know, I can't really address 
something that hasn't even been raised here, but—but the 
thing is, if—if it really was a minority position, why 
haven't they cited a single case from the majority position? 
I submit that it's—it's not the minority position. There is 
no case out there that stands for the proposition that—that 
somebody can just—somebody can just disclose to—to the 
supposed record shareholders, even though they knew that that 
person didn't hold the interest in those shares. 
And that's essentially what they're trying tq ask 
the Court to do here. That even though the defendant, Gay, 
knew that the F.D.I.C. held all the interest in the Hogle 
shares, that still, all they had to do was go tell Hogle what 
their intentions were with regard to the property. And 
frankly, that's—that's a position that's totally unsupported 
in any case. 
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MR. JORDAN: W e - l l ^ l S ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
to engage in a jack-in-the-box effort 'ti^xe^JS&T^^SSS^S. 
speci~I discuss it in a full page of brief/^citindwi^^'1fS 
at Pages 11 and 12 of my reply menjo. 
THE COURT: Okay. Very well, gentlemen. I'lVtaice 
the matter under advisement and I will give you my decision. 
Thank you very much. 
MR. HARTMAN: Thank you, your Honor. 
MR. JORDAN: Thank you. 
(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.) 
* * * 
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